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In some recent and most interesting articles, Myles 
Brand argues that intending has an exclusively conative 
feature. 1 This conative feature is said by Brand to be 
non-cognitive and to be that aspect of an episode of 
intending which moves an agent to act. Brand alleges 
that the conative feature of intending must be included 
in any satisfactory answer to what he calls the funda-
mental question in action theory: what characteristics 
must a mental event possess in order to be the proxi-
mate cause of action? Brand contends that no philo-
sophical theory of the relation between intending and 
acting has been offered which includes the conative 
feature of intending as an element. Therefore, he 
thinks that no philosophical theory of the relation 
between intending and acting has answered the fundamen-
tal question in action theory. I shall argue, however, 
that one contemporary theory of the relation between 
intending and acting does contain an account of the 
conative feature of which Brand speaks. I shall submit 
that Hector-Neri Castaneda's theory of the relation 
between intending and acting provides an answer to the 
fundamental question in action theory. 1 
Brand's identification of a conative component of 
intending is best understood in light of the recent 
history of Causal theories of action. Basciaily, a 
Causal theory is one which holds that intentional ac-
tion is caused by a preceding mental event of a partic-
ular kind. Recent interest and developments in such 
theories owe much in impetus to the work of Donald 
Davidson whose version of the Causal theory holds that 
the mental event causing action is the combination of a 
pro-attitude toward actions of a certain kind and the 
belief that such actions can be performed. 1 A pro-
attitude, according to Davidson, can be a desire, a 
wanting, an urging, a prompting, and numerous other 
things, such as a moral view, an aesthetic principle, a 
private goal, etc. Davidson's account, however, has 
been severely criticized. Wilfrid Sellars, for exam-
ple, finds Davidson's theory objectionable on the 
grounds that it does not pinpoint the type of mental 
event that has action as its effect." Sellars thinks 
that the term 'pro-attitude' does not identify with 
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sufficient specificity the mental event that causes 
action. To correct Davidson's undersight, Sellars 
proposes that the mental event causing action is an 
agent's intending to do something here and now. For 
example, on Sellar's view, when an agent picks up a 
newspaper, he or she forms the intention to pick up the 
newspaper here and now, and this episode of intending 
on the part of the agent is the mental event that 
causes his or her picking up of the newspaper. In his 
appraisal of Causal theories, Brand notes that Sellars 1 
version fails to provide a complete account of the re-
lation between intending and acting, because it says 
nothing about the internal structure of an intending to 
do something here and now. Therefore, Brand finds 
promising the work of Castaneda, whose version of the 
Causal theory explores the internal structure of epi-
sodes of intending. 
Expanding on Sellars' view, Castaneda theorizes 
that an episode of intending to do something here and 
now has a special sort of thought-content as its ob-
ject. Castaneda calls this thought-content a first-
person practition. Endorsingly thinking a first-person 
practition constitutes, for Castaneda, an episode of 
intending to do something here and now and triggers the 
action mechanisms involved in performing the action. 
To illustrate, suppose that I jump intentionally. Cas-
taneda' s view is that my jumping intentionally proceeds 
from my focusing upon I (i.e. me, myself)* and upon the 
act-type jump. This focusing generates in my mind the 
thought-content *I (to) jump*, a first-person 
practition. The '(to)' in the notation of the first-
person practition represents what Castafieda calls the 
practical copula which connects subject and predicate 
in an actional, as opposed to a contemplative, way. 
Next, and most crucially, my thinking endorsingly *I 
(to) jump* triggers the action mechanisms involved in 
my jumping. It is important to see that Castaneda's 
theory does not recognize the mere generation of a 
first-person practition to constitute an episode of 
intending. Only the endorsing-thinking of a first-
person practition is said to be sufficient to effect 
intentional action. 
Brand argues that Castaneda's account, like Sel-
lars' account, fails to provide a complete description 
of the mental event that causes action. He alleges 
that Castaneda has analyzed the relation between in-
tending and acting solely in terms of the purely cogni-
tive event of focusing. In defense of this charge, 
Brand asks us to imagine that an agent is in a room in 
which he has the opportunity to jump up and touch the 
ceiling. Brand points out that even though the agent 
may focus on himself performing that action, he still 
may not actually jump up and touch the ceiling. This 
fact is said to show that focusing on oneself perform-
ing a particular action is insufficient to bring the 
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action about, that, in addition to the cognitive activ-
ity of focusing, there must be a moving of the agent to 
act. Consequently, Brand insists that the mental event 
that causes action must include a self-pushing aspect 
that is the proximate cause of action. This self-
pushing aspect is referred to by Brand as the conative 
component of intending. Brand claims that although Cas-
taneda's more detailed description of the relation be-
tween intending and acting renders his Causal theory an 
improvement over previous versions, it, too, is incom-
plete in that it omits this essential conative element. 
Therefore, Brand thinks that Castaneda has not answered 
the fundamental question in action theory. 
Brand's charge that Castaneda's theory omits the 
so-called conative component of intending is mistaken. 
Brand is surely correct to point out that merely focus-
ing on oneself performing a particular action is not 
sufficient to bring the action about and that some sort 
of self-pushing or moving of the agent to act must also 
be involved in the mental event that causes action. 
This fact, however, is clearly accommodated by Cas-
taneda' s theory in its distinction between the genera-
tion of a first-person practition, in which focusing is 
involved, and the endorsing-thinking of a first-person 
practition, which initiates action. On CastafTeda's ac-
count, an intentional action depends not only on the 
agent's focusing on himself doing the action he in-
tends, but also on the agent's endorsingly thinking the 
particular first-person practition that is generated 
out of his focusing. Without the endorsing-thinking of 
a first-person practition, there is no episode of in-
tending and, therefore, no intentional action, as far 
as Castaneda's theory is concerned. However, with the 
endorsing-thinking of a first-person practition, action 
is triggered, according to Castaffeda, unless some pro-
hibitive force is operative. That is, the endorsing-
thinking of a first-person practition is, in Brand's 
terms, a self-pushing or a moving of the agent to act 
in that it triggers the action mechanisms involved in 
bringing the intended action about. Thus, Castaffeda 
does not analyze the relation between intending and 
acting solely in terms of the cognitive event of focus-
ing, as Brand claims. Rather, the more crucial element 
in his theory is the endorsing-thinking of a first-
person practition, which satisfies Brand's demand that 
an account of the relation between intending and acting 
include a conative feature. Brand attends only to the 
mechanism of focusing that Castaneda describes and 
overlooks the endorsing-thinking that Castafieda also 
claims to be occurring in episodes of intending. 
Castaneda's theory clearly recognizes that no amount of 
focusing, alone, is sufficient to effect action, that 
only the endorsing-thinking of a first-person prac-
tition with its moving of the agent to act is so suf-
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ficient. Castafieda has, therefore, provided an answer 
to the fundamental question in action theory. 
My thesis in this paper is important to the direc-
tion of future work in action theory. Finding no 
analysis of the conative feature of intending present 
in contemporary philosophical theories of action, Brand 
has decided to look to motivational psychology for 
help. His conviction is that the time has come for 
"the philosophy of action and motivational psychology 
to proceed in concert."' Brand finds promising the 
work of John Atkinson and David Birch. 1 They presup-
pose that a peron has a large number of tendencies for 
activity. A person does a certain activity when his 
tendency to do that activity is dominant and continues 
in that activity until a time when another tendency 
becomes dominant. Atkinson and Birch set themselves to 
explain what causes a person to change from one activ-
ity to another. This is the problem of motivation. 
They allow that mental events can strengthen the insti-
gatory force to perform a certain activity.' Their 
view is that it is the content of a mental event which 
strengthens the instigatory force to perform a certain 
action. Their example is that the content of the 
thought of eating steak strengthens the instigatory 
force to eat steak. 
Brand thinks that Atkinson and Birch's work is 
promising for philosophical action theorists to in-
vestigate because it may provide a clue regarding the 
nature of the conative feature of intending. Yet, he 
strongly objects to their view that the content of a 
thought can strengthen the tendency to act. Merely con-
templating a thought-content, according to Brand, does 
not move a person to act. 
I suggest that there is no need for philosophical 
action theorists to venture into motivational psycho-
logy in order to find an account of the conative fea-
ture of intending. Brand, himself, does not find a 
satisfactory account in motivational psychology lit-
erature. What is more, if my thesis is correct, an ac-
count of the conative feature of intending has already 
been offered in philosophical action theory by Cas-
taneda . 
My thesis is also important to understanding the 
distinctive nature of Castafieda's action theory. 
Traditionally, the objects of intending episodes have 
been taken to be propositions.' A problem with this 
view is that one can endorse a future-tense proposition 
(e.g. 'I will jump') without jumping. Endorsing a 
proposition does not, by itself, produce action. In 
other words, an agent can think of doing an action and 
not do it. Castaneda, however, unlike his counterparts 
who hold that the objects of intending episodes are 
propositions, does explain the causality that is opera-
tive in intentional actions. He does so by theorizing 
that the objects of intending episodes are practitions, 
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not propositions. While an agent can endorse the 
proposition 'I will jump' without jumping, an agent 
cannot endorse the practition *I (to) jump* without 
jumping, unless something goes wrong. Castaneda 
analyzes the thinking causality involved in intentional 
action, that which effects the transition from the men-
tal to the physical, as the endorsement of the special 
thought-content of intending episodes. 1' Practitions, 
by their nature, when endorsed, produce action. This 
unique idea should command the attention of those work-
ing in action theory because it does, indeed, provide 
an answer to the fundamental question in action 
theory. 1 1 
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